Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

(Due to arrive Melbourne 21.2.25)

My dear P.M.,

I have been here now for two months, and although it is still
early in the day to start reviewing the position, I am going to
try and do so, as much to crystallise my own mind as anything
else.

First of all, I think I have made friends with Hankey [1] and with
the heads of departments in the Foreign and Colonial Offices. I
have all the authority to get and see and extract from official
papers that I can reasonably expect. As far as I know, nothing is
kept back from me. In the words of Mr. Chamberlain's [2] written
authority to the Foreign Office, they are to tell me all that they
would tell you if you were here. I have an office in the best
location to do the job and a good Secretary in the shape of Miss
Procter. In other words, I think I am in the position that you
wanted, of being able to send you early, accurate information of
events and tendencies, limited in the amount of detail telegraphed
only by one's cable expenses, and by one's energy as regards
written despatches.

As a rough scheme on which to work, it seems to be no less than
essential to try and dig out from printed F.O. and other documents
and from conversations with F.O. people sufficient of the past
story of our relations with each individual country to make your
files in Melbourne complete enough to enable you (and Henderson
[3]) to read current telegrams and despatches with a reasonably
full knowledge of what has led up to the present position.
In other words, this means the gradual building up of a set of
confidential reference files of information of reliability
guaranteed by the past experience of the Foreign Office, and kept
up-to-date by the working of the diplomatic machinery that centres
on the Foreign Office.

The speed with which these prior history files can be completed
depends on the amount of time that one can spare from current
affairs. It means reading and digesting a great deal of print, and
sending out copies of the more important documents and making
summaries of others. This has the advantage that it fixes the
story in one's own mind, at the same time as one sends it out to
file in Australia. There is nothing very difficult in it and it is
very interesting work, and although it seems essential to do it,
for the sake of my own knowledge as well as Henderson's, yet I
grudge a good deal the time that it takes me away from what are
without doubt more important current questions.

As you well know, people of note-and others-have talked and
written at a great and increasing rate in recent years on this
subject of the maintenance of the Empire and the share and
responsibility of the Dominions in the conduct of foreign affairs.
It is apparently a question so difficult that nothing but rather
obvious and simple solutions have been offered-even speculatively
-by anyone. I admit that I haven't yet read a fraction of what has
been written on the subject. It's a pleasant subject to browse on
as long as you keep your mind on a high and abstract plane, but
apparently rather a thorny one when you come down to actualities
and try to paint in the detail of any new constitutional machinery
to do the job. Nothing, however, can alter the fact that the real
machinery for decision on any point, or at any crisis, is the
Prime Minister and the Parliament of the Dominion at the seat of
Government of the Dominion.

With this premise, an Australian Minister, permanently or quasi-
permanently resident in London, would not seem to me to fill the
bill any better than a political Liaison Office, with a small
active staff. Your Minister would not be able to do more than
transmit to the British Government the views of the Australian
Cabinet, and in nine cases out of ten, he would speak officially
only on definite instruction from Australia. This function your
Liaison Office, or your High Commissioner, could do equally well.
The rough work of digging information as to our foreign relations
out of the Foreign Office (and other sources) would still have to
be done, and I can't see your Minister doing it effectively,
except with a staff of at least the size of the Political Liaison
Office.

The present scheme has the additional advantage that it involves
no great constitutional change, whereas the presence of an
accredited Minister in London might in time lead to unforeseen
situations.

So that, except from a window-dressing point of view, or to
maintain our status if another Dominion sent a Minister here, I do
not see at present that you would improve the position much by
sending a Minister.

I must admit that I can't see that such vast difficulties exist in
the way of keeping you intimately informed on the general tone and
conduct of this country's foreign relations, in sufficient time
for you to make your voice heard on the subject.

Australia and Great Britain are for practical purposes two
intimately allied countries. Friendly co-operation and complete
frankness on both sides, fortified with active personal liaison,
should, from what little I have seen of things, enable the present
position to be continued without constitutional change.
Abstract discussion as to the exact constitutional relations of
Great Britain and the Dominions does not seem to me to be within
the range of practical politics. The position is well known in
fact even although we have no defined form of words to express it.
It may, you can almost say it would, be awkward to say just what
would happen in a great crisis such as war or peace, but that
would be no less the case as between any two or more allied
countries faced with coming to a quick decision on a momentous
question.

Up to the present, generally speaking, the Dominions have been
officially communicated with only when all the arguments regarding
a situation or a proposal have been completely thrashed out here.
The Dominions are then (fairly late in the day) told the answer
from the point of view of this country, and are asked to concur or
suggest, at the same time being told very briefly the main
considerations affecting the British Cabinet's point of view. They
have not been told the running story of the negotiations, the
proceedings of the sub-committee told off to work up the subject
to a fine point, or the intimate story of the several alternatives
and how each would affect our relations with other powers. All
this the Dominions' Cabinets are left to reconstruct, rightly or
wrongly, in their own minds. This must make it difficult for a
Dominion Cabinet to take a strong line in support of the British
point of view; it means that they usually have no time to inform
or warn public opinion in the Dominion as to the way a decision
must go, having regard to the ultimate best interests of the
Empire.

I take it that the above state of affairs has been at the root of
the greater part of the misunderstandings and irritation between
this country and Australia. And it is one that can be readily put
right, if not by the British Government being more frank in
communications (which may not be possible or desirable), then by
someone in the position of myself, who, in the confidence of this
Government, is put in the way of knowing all that is going on, and
communicates the gist of it, constantly and fully, in confidential
cables and despatches to you.

The cabling of a coded message that would occupy a closely typed
foolscap page costs about 10. A lot can be got into such a
message. It can reach you three hours after it leaves this office,
and in about eighteen months, when the Pacific cable is
duplicated, it will reach you in probably half that time. It means
that I can send you a cable at 6 p.m. here, about some event, and
have your cabled views in reply early next day.
If you do not mind my sending you cables to the extent of up to
say 1,000 a year, I think it is fairly certain that I can keep
you in very close touch with all negotiations of importance. You
have not up to now limited me as regards cable expenditure and
unless I hear from you to the contrary, I will continue to use the
cable freely at my discretion.

I take it that a really sudden crisis is a very rare event. A
'crisis' is the climax of strained relations, and can usually be
seen coming some time before. Even 1914 would not be outside this
description. And it is the full details of such coming events as
cast shadows that I take it you have sent me here to send you.
I have not yet seen enough of things to be in a position to make
any recommendation on the subject, but it may be that a little
later I will submit to you a proposal to appoint another officer
here to assist me. There is a lot of ground to cover, and if one
is to run no risks of missing anything, it might be worth while
having a second man. One might go sick, or it might (it probably
will) be worth while my going to the Continent at times, to get
some personal touch and knowledge of the many problems amongst the
European countries. A man like Longfield Lloyd [4] would be a
great help.

I regret having burdened you with such a lengthy letter. On the
other hand, I would much appreciate your views generally on the
points I have tried to make, when you are free enough to write.

I am, Yours sincerely,
R. G. CASEY