Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

My telegram 31st August, 1944, D No. 1237. [1] World Organisation
and Soviet Constituent Republics.

1. When the Soviet Representative at Dumbarton Oaks proposed that
the 16 Soviet Constituent Republics should be founder members of
World Organisation, he agreed, at instance of United States
Representative, not to pursue it at the time. Although the Soviet
Representative did not at first raise objection to recommending
inclusion of 'Associated Nations' (i.e. Chile, Equador, Egypt,
Iceland, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) he did so later.
No definite conclusion was reached on this point and the eventual
recommendation was (chapter 3) that 'membership of the
Organisation should be open to all peace-loving states'.
2. We are now considering what attitude we should adopt on the
question of membership in any further international discussions.
3. Soviet Constituent Republics. In this connection we have
referred to views expressed by other British Commonwealth
Governments in July, 1944, in reply to my telegram 29th June,
1944, D No. 947. [2] It seems to us that if the Soviet claim is
accepted in the case of World Organisation it would have to be
accepted in all other cases and recognition of Constituent
Republics as independent sovereign states and exchange of
diplomatic representatives would follow as a matter of course. If,
however, the Soviet Government could be persuaded to withdraw
their claim in this case, other cases should be dealt with
separately later. In any event we feel that whatever the exact
constitutional position of Constituent Republics the issue will
have to be dealt with as a political and not as a constitutional
question.
4. From the point of view of purely British interests, it would
clearly be better that World Organisation machinery should include
only one Soviet vote and not sixteen (or seventeen if the Soviet
Union had a vote as well and the sixteen republics). If, as would
probably be the case, Union of Social Soviet Republics could rely
on support both of Constituent Republics and certain neighbouring
states it might command a bloc of twenty-two or twenty-four votes
which might represent more than one-third of total votes in
Assembly at any rate of early years. If it were the rule that a
two-thirds majority would be needed for important decisions Soviet
voting strength would not suffice to carry the day without the
support of a large number of other states but it could block
decisions of which the Soviet Government disapproved.
5. The immediate practical consideration which carries much weight
with us is that it could be argued that on paper Constituent
Republics have more autonomy in Foreign Affairs than India e.g.
their own Foreign Ministers, their own Armed Forces, right to
enter into agreements with other countries and right to exchange
diplomatic and consular representatives even though the Soviet
Government retains 'Representation of Union in International
relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties and
establishment of general character of relations between Union
Republic and Foreign States'. Whatever the facts may be it would
be invidious for us to enter into detailed argument with Soviet
Government as to the precise practical significance of the
theoretical constitutional position.
6. Nevertheless, we feel that inclusion of 16 Republics with votes
might, in practice, so undermine the authority of the World
Organisation as to render it unworkable. The Soviet Union would in
effect be in a position to cast nearly one-third of the total
votes in elections for non-permanent members of the Security
Council, members of Economic and Social Council and Judges of the
Permanent Court of International Justice. We have not overlooked
the Latin-American Bloc of some twenty votes. But these are not
under the absolute control of a single Government in the same way
as the Soviet votes would almost certainly be. We feel grave
doubts whether other countries would accept the Soviet claim and
some such as China, France and Brazil might claim additional votes
for parts of their territory. In particular, it seems highly
unlikely that the United States Government would accept membership
in a World Organisation in which they had only one vote and the
Soviet Government controlled sixteen or seventeen and United
States membership is a fundamental assumption.
7. We consider that our aim should be-
(A) To make the World Organisation work effectively and
(B) To avoid friction with either the Soviet Government or the
United States Government.
As their views are so far apart the following courses seem open to
us:-
(1) To agree to the Soviet claim. This would put us in an
embarrassing position vis-a-vis the United States Government and
might easily wreck the whole organisation;
(2) To adopt an attitude of flat opposition. The constitutional
position of India makes this difficult and the Soviet Government
might attribute opposition to purely political grounds;
(3) To let the United States Government take the initiative in
opposing the views of the Soviet Government, it would then be open
to us to accept some compromise acceptable to both the Soviet and
United States Governments provided that it would not exclude
India. If a deadlock were reached, we could declare our support
for the United States Government.
8. Associated Nations. We consider that we should support
inclusion as initial members of countries named in paragraph 1
above plus Turkey.
9. We should be glad of the views of other British Commonwealth
Governments.