Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade

My dear Prime Minister,

Further to my letter of to-day addressed to the Secretary of the
Prime Minister's Department.

I spent the week-end with Sir Maurice Hankey [1] in the country. I
write you this personal and confidential note mainly to tell you
what transpired.

With regard to the League: Austen Chamberlain [2], as you know,
decided to attend the Council Meeting at Rome himself although it
was very inconvenient. The reason was two-fold. Firstly, the new
Government wanted to make an early gesture indicating their great
confidence in the League in an effort to increase its prestige;
secondly the Government had not been satisfied with the
representation of Lord Robert Cecil. [3] As you know, he is
regarded rather as a fanatic on the subject of the League and the
position was arising that he was putting forward his own personal
convictions and ideas at Council Meetings rather than proposals
that were strictly representative of the Government's views.
Hankey expressed the opinion that from now on as far as the League
went Cecil's star was on the wane.

I find that until the 8th inst. you had not been sent any
information with regard to Persia. There has been considerable
trouble brewing there for some little time and it has necessitated
the greatest forbearance on the part of the Government to get over
the necessity for a display of force in order to protect the
property and interests of the Persian Oil Company. I need not go
into detail here but will only say that the trouble has arisen
through the conflicting ambitions of Reza Khan the Prime Minister
of Persia and the Sheikh of Mohammerah, in whose district the
Persian Oil Company's property lies. This Persian trouble has been
kept entirely out of the Press in some miraculous fashion. From
the telegrams that I have seen in the last day or so it looks as
if the chance of an outbreak has been tided over.

The Egyptian and Sudanese trouble [4] followed by our declaration
that we are going on with the Singapore base would not have been a
good forerunner to our using the big stick in Persia and almost
certainly at a little later date to our turning down the Protocol.
This combination of incidents would have given the new Government
[5] altogether too much of an Imperialistic and high-handed
flavour which might have made our relations with other countries a
little strained.

I have been a good deal surprised and enlightened as to the very
broad scope and important work being carried out by the Committee
of Imperial Defence, which I had in my ignorance regarded as a
politely constituted body to which rather academic questions were
referred. I find that it is very live, uses actively the best
technical brains in the country and is a very complete
coordinating body for the purpose of ensuring that we are not
caught unawares in any future war. Their Sub-Committees appear to
embrace almost every condition under which the Empire might be
involved in war and the personnel and equipment problems in their
broad aspects and in detail to meet such a contingency. In my
position in Hankey's Office I am in the way of seeing the Papers
and obtaining their deliberations and I look forward to being able
to send you some useful matter, which, even if not of interest to
you in detail, will indicate how their minds are working.

With regard to the Protocol, I hear in the strictest confidence
that at the Committee of Imperial Defence Meeting on this subject
on the 4th instant, a broad proposal of great interest was made by
Lord Curzon. [6] He pointed out that the Disarmament Protocol as
now framed was a distinct movement away from the possibility of
America going into the League. He threw out as a general
suggestion that we should not adhere to the Protocol but on the
contrary should come forward with some counter-proposal which
would at the same time offer some security to France and also make
it easier, and not harder, for America at some future date to come
into the League. Thought on these lines will, of course, take a
great deal of developing and it will no doubt be some time before
anything materialises. I give you this merely to show how their
minds are working. It is possible that they may invite you to come
to London if this or any similar project reaches definite shape
and looks as if it must involve close collaboration with the Prime
Ministers. This was hinted at by Hankey and if anything more comes
of it I will see that you are warned well in advance.

I had a short talk to Sir Cecil Hurst [7] a few days ago. He
admitted that sentiment in this country was moving against the
Protocol but said that he thought that even if the Protocol were
rejected as now framed it would not have been time wasted as some
very essential ground had been covered in the discussions and
people's minds were clearer as to the possibilities of such
agreements in extension of the Covenant. Owing to his large share
in the drafting of the Protocol he has apparently not beet)
consulted subsequently to any extent, on account, I expect, of his
known bias in favour of it.

I have met and talked somewhat briefly to a number of people and
am still doing so more with an idea of getting to know them rather
than, as yet, seriously to tackle the job in hand. I am afraid,
therefore, that my communications up to the present have not
contained anything very important but I think you will realise
that I have first got to make myself known to a number of people
and then to make myself au fait with the subjects one has to deal
with before being in a position to send you anything very much.
I think I can safely say that the outlook promises well for my
being able to be of use to you. I have come across nothing up to
the present that could be called a real difficulty in the way of
my getting established.

With best wishes, I am, Yours sincerely,
R. G. CASEY