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15 Commonwealth Government to Cranborne
Cablegram 22 CANBERRA, 27 January 1945
TOP SECRET
1. Your D. No. 148. [1]
The claim of Russia for separate representation for its component
Republics depends in principle upon whether each republic is a
free international unit with power to take up a separate and
distinct attitude in international affairs from that taken by the
Soviet itself. Each of the five British Dominions fully answers to
such a principle which is illustrated by the neutrality of Eire in
the present war and the state of war declared by the other four
Dominions. India, however, hardly answers to the principle because
under the Indian constitution, its external policy is not
determined by India alone.
2. There is a practical side to the question. At the recent
aviation conference in Chicago there were 51 states represented,
some of them with little international significance and no share
whatever in the present war. Yet the views of nations which had
borne the brunt of the fighting in this war were over-ridden by
the block votes on the part of 19 South American countries. The
Soviet sees this and also considers that the British Dominions
will generally act in concert with the United Kingdom. Therefore,
it is determined not to be outvoted.
3. We think it is most inadvisable to treat this question of
Russian republics in isolation from other questions of world
organisation, some of which were recently referred to you as a
result of the Wellington Conference between the Australian and New
Zealand Governments.
4. You recently decided to support President Roosevelt's
suggestion of a compromise on the vexed question of the necessity
for unanimity in certain matters going before the proposed
Security Council. We agree with President Roosevelt's suggestion,
but there, as in the case of the present matter, we did not think
it wise to treat the question in isolation from other crucial
questions involved in the proposed organisation. One of those
other crucial questions is that of representation of the Russian
component republics.
5. It is not possible to deal by cable with the possible
suggestions and counter suggestions which may arise in the course
of bargaining. It might be wise to yield to Russia on the question
of Council veto only if Russia agreed to abandon her claim for
separate representation of her component republics. The attitude
of Canada to the organisation and the Council will, no doubt, be
affected by the probable composition of the Council. In many
respects Australia's attitude corresponds to that of Canada. You
have already indicated that you propose that the British
Commonwealth shall consult together on these matters before final
decisions are reached. The process of bargaining and compromise
[is a difficult one but it is unavoidable. If we give way or
compromise] [2] on each point as though it were a separate and
unrelated point the general result may be very far from
satisfactory.
6. For the reasons set out we would prefer that the minimum degree
of commitment be made on the present question and also in that of
the right of veto.
1 Dispatched 25 January, on file AA:1066, H45/765. It sought an
early reply to Document 6.
2 Words in square brackets have been inserted from the Washington
copy, on file
AA:A3300/5, 1945, Post War: International World Organisation.
[AA:A1066, H45/765]
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